FEATURE
MARTIME SECURITY
Aerographer's Mate 2nd Class Brianna Frazier, left, of Honolulu, and Aerographer's Mate 2nd Class Kristopher Rodriguez, of Baltimore, release a weather balloon from the fantail of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63). The radiosonde, a radio transmitter attached to the balloon, has sensors that measures meteorological variables. (Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kyle D. Gahlau)
It's not bigger ships, or better weapons that matter, it's the bigger, better picture
by Capt. Edward Lundquist, USN (Ret.)
Get the Picture
World Wars (Naval Institute Press 2009). Instead of propulsion or weapons, Friedman says the two biggest developments in naval warfare have been sensors and communication. "The essence of network-centric warfare is the creation of a picture that various commanders can share. To multiply surveillance is to multiply what you can see," he says. "The picture is what matters." Radio enabled position and contact reports to be shared with other ships in company, as well as other units, command elements and shore-based headquarters. Information about weather observations, sea conditions, fuel states and equipment status became valuable commodities. For better or worse, the actions of a ship could be directed from commanders who were over the horizon,
There are many noteworthy technological developments that have "changed naval warfare." But naval analyst and author Norman Friedman says it wasn't a new weapon or a new kind of propulsion system. Instead, Friedman says it's the picture that matters. It wasn't until there was an effective way to know what was beyond the visual horizon, and a way to communicate and share information that warfare at sea really changed. New sensors and ways to communicate have enabled a "picture" of the situation to be created, shared and understood by other ships and even command posts ashore. For centuries, the only way a man-ofwar became aware of the presence of an enemy on the sea was the sighting of a mast the horizon. Then it was decision time: observe, investigate, engage, escape or evade. If there were several ships in company, the senior in command could signal to other ships in company, but his span of control was limited to the range of visual signal flags or flashing lights among his flotilla. If the forces should meet in battle, it might be days before the result was known by those ashore. Radio let ships share information about the tactical situation with other ships and shore headquarters. Radar changed what ships could see, and thus what they could share. Computers helped commanders make decisions. Altogether, sensors, communications and computing power have enabled networks. We refer to this as net-centric warfare. But what is really important is the "picture," not the network, according to naval analyst Dr. Norman Friedman, author of Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three
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or even hundreds or thousands of miles away. Those commanders who were removed from the tactical situation might actually have the bigger picture, but often would make decisions based on what they thought to be the situation locally. With the development of radar, commanders now had a picture of own forces, enemy forces, and land or obstructions, even in bad weather or at night. This is a double-edged sword, Friedman says, because there is an assumption that what you see as the picture is correct. "Those using the picture created by the network assume that what is on their screens is reality. A creative and deceptive enemy can use that assumption to his advantage. If no one checks the picture on the screen against reality, the result can be disastrous."
Today's Big Picture
Maritime Domain Awareness
Improving awareness requires continued development of traditional allsource maritime intelligence capabilities, as well as a broader maritime situational awareness that leverages maritime Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and provides a "picture" of conditions and activity across the maritime domain. This awareness will include information about vessels (dynamic track data as well as static data on history, ownership, characteristics, etc.), people (passengers, crew, dock workers, agents, etc.), cargoes, weather, environment, and infrastructure. Achieving maritime domain awareness will involve collection, fusion, analysis, and dissemination to a wide range of decision makers from local enforcement officers to national leaders. The Coast Guard is working with DoD and other partner agencies to build domestic and global awareness of the maritime domain, but this will require the participation of all maritime stakeholders. Government and private stakeholders must establish an unprecedented level of information sharing and intelligence integration. From the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship
"Radio was the beginning, because it made possible real-time coordination over vast distances. Nothing like that had ever existed before," Friedman says. Greater capability also brought complexity. These new developments could also be exploited. Direction finding could locate the position of an enemy transmitting a radio message. False information could be transmitted to mislead an adversary. Signals could be jammed; intercepted or decoded. "It made possible ocean surveillance, because enemy radio signals could be intercepted and exploited." However, network-centric warfare isn't really a form of warfare, but rather a way of using information. "Once the picture becomes the focus, those who create and maintain it use everything at hand to improve it. They don't limit themselves to one source of information or another." If the point is to accumulate and use information, the issue is how to make sense of an avalanche of it, Friedman says. "That takes a computer--and the faster the computer, the more information it can assemble into a usable whole. Moore's Law says that computer capacity doubles every 18 months or less. As long as that continues (surely not forever), it becomes worthwhile to gather more and more information, and smaller and smaller units can accommodate useful combinations of information." Net-centric warfare has given rise to a new breed of weapons, called "fire and forget." Anti-ship cruise missiles like Harpoon are fired in the direction of a known enemy ship position. The weapon takes over, locates and flies to the target without any further direction from the firing ship. Such weapon, once fired, can
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