instability -- the issue of oil production being just one example of this. There are a number of 'lower level' measures that can, and should be addressed by vessel owners and port authorities alike in preparation for possible piracy incidents, and issuing guns is not necessarily the only consideration when examining deterrence and counter measures. Interestingly, the RAND report rightly concludes that expanding maritime security and conducting assessments on a more regular basis are the way forward. The commercial maritime sector is also encouraged to engage the use of defensive technologies and other communication tools as a further measure. Modern day piracy is far more organized and violent than ever before, and the perpetrators have access to far better equipment. Attacks cost the maritime industry millions of dollars and so any investment to prevent and counter it should be considered. Essentially, what we are looking for here is 'best practice'. Experienced maritime security companies have a pivotal role to play in providing the backbone to legislative compliance, and appropriate experience, transparency, and high standards of training are definitely part of the answer in the prevention of, and response to, attacks on vessels. But what exactly is the right level of protection? The 'route one' plan, for some, is to meet force with force -- by having specialist, armed security or arming the crew. But should ships, rigs and port facilities have specialist armed guard teams aboard, or issue firearms to ordinary crew members? Arming crew is not necessarily the answer. The risks of providing weapon training to ships crew are considerable. It may appear an obvious point, but allowing anyone to take up arms without instruction (or providing incorrect instruction) will at best render the whole exercise ineffective when it comes to the moment of truth, and in the worst case scenario, result in a fatality. Firing over the bow of a ship is one thing, but once on board, drawing and effectively using weapons inside the close confines of a vessel is the last thing anyone wants to see, and only those skilled in this kind of conflict should ever be called upon in such tense situations. Training in the use of firearms is a lengthy and serious business. All of our armed Security Officers undergo weapons specific training, handling,
August 2008
maintenance and Rules of Engagement at one of our training facilities, and specific refresher training is conducted (where possible) on board vessels. While it would be inappropriate here to reveal the actual rules of engagement when using weapons, there are strict rules that apply. These may be written in support of a Ship's Security Plan, agreed with the client (and ship's master), and any armed Security Officers must be well rehearsed in all aspects of these regulations. Furthermore, although we have qualified instructors on vessels we generally do not provide security training to the crew as it can lead to numerous issues particularly with client's insurers and P&I clubs who are very reluctant to extend cover to crew. We have to carry substantial additional insurance cover ourselves for the deployment and use of firearms. The issues of deploying arms on board do not stop with insurance. There are strict rules to adhere to for the Master, who retains ultimate sovereignty over weapons on a vessel. Also, it must be remembered that some ports around the world do not permit vessels to berth with weapons on board - even if locked away in bonded store, and there are serious legal implications for those not obeying these regulations. The International Maritime Organization actually discourages the use of weapons and the attack on the cruise ship Seabourn Spirit demonstrated that aggressors can be dealt with through sound security procedures and countermeasures rather than weapons. The delivery of a carefully crafted and tested security routine proved to be a highly effective deterrent to this particular armed assault. This is where the experienced, reputable maritime security provider can help, by offering security assessments, with practical solutions and responsible advice. During this process risk analysis will always consider all options, and often identify 'non lethal' methods of deterrence and response. Effective lighting is a must but is frequently overlooked. Constant watches and, even physical barriers erected on low free board vessels are all methods that are easy to put into operation. A visible deterrent such as regular deck security patrols day and night also helps. Non-lethal acoustic devices, such as LRAD, are frequently effectively employed on vessels, and better use of radar, video cameras, thermal imaging technology and electrical fencing should be first considerations before
firearms. That said, there is a misconception that these methods do not require training. Such devices are only as good as their operators and it is vital to properly train operatives and establish good operating practices and procedures for their use. The issue of piracy is clearly not going away. Tackling the problem is more a balance of time over resources (and finance). Except for those areas that have been touched on by RAND, there seems to be no clear guidance on how the security void between overstretched naval resources and overworked commercial shipping crews should be filled. In order to put into operation all of the methods mentioned above it is clear that outside help is required and a responsible, maritime security service provider should be able to assist without over specifying security requirements. If governments want to be seen to be taking effective steps against piracy they could do no harm by sanctioning a global standard of performance and vetting procedure for all security companies, and put forward funds to help shipping companies and facilities with the financial burden of achieving maritime security. After all, it will be the consumer who has to foot the bill when the costs of additional security eventually trickle down to the high street. It will be the vessel's crew who could pay with their lives if help is not provided.
About the Author
Having previously served in the U.S. Army and then working as a contractor with the U.S. government, Stan Ayscue joined Securewest International in 2004. Based in the U.S., Stan is currently employed by Securewest International as business development manager and is responsible for identifying and creating solutions for the company's clients worldwide. www.securewest.com
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