Security
Along the Watchtower
The Growth of Energy Dependence and Subsequent Maritime Security Implications
Energy growth is a fact and together with petroleum, LNG will play an important and major role in meeting the consumer demand over the coming years. The ever-increasing reliance on oil and gaseous fuels required to power major economies around the globe carries with it one particularly sinister knock-on effect, namely the threat from both piracy, and terrorist organizations that accompanies energy delivery by sea. The main area of contention regarding petroleum and LNG security is the exact risk it holds. To-date it has been a very safe industry with an almost clean bill of health in the past 40 years. This is no accident and is largely due to high safety standards, strict regulation and high levels of industry co-operation as regards safety issues. But dependency brings with an inherent stress to the supply chain security. Nations like China and India crave the delivery of LNG and other energy sources by the biggest and most efficient manner possible. This means larger vessels. Larger vessels means bigger security headaches, and should mean better security provision by those concerned. Its not just India and China who should be wary. The EU's consumption of LNG alone is set to rise somewhere between 130 to 300 million tons per year in the near future. All of a sudden we have very prominent targets - both vessels and terminals - that can easily fulfil the terrorist criteria of maximum economic disruption and media exposure. The Middle East is the fastest growing exporter of LNG and we all know about security issues in that arena. Over reliance on such a fuel supply chain means that they become a glorious target for terrorists and pirates alike. Huge vessels hauling bigger and bigger volumes of oil and LNG provide a tempting 'hostage' to pirates and a floating bomb opportunity for terror groups looking to take a vessel into a port to then detonate explosives placed on board. While petroleum has obvious explosive qualities, those of LNG are a contentious point. The industry maintains
22
that it is not explosive or highly flammable until it regains its gaseous state. It is of course the duty of the industry to tow this line, and while elements of the argument are true, the fact remains that LNG can catch fire at sea if a tank is ruptured. It hasn't happened so far, but that doesn't rule out a situation that can be manufactured to deliberately cause a tanker to explode. It is thought that a tank rupture would cause the material to flow out at speed and part of the liquid will then form a gas cloud. How big and where it drifts depend on conditions at the time of the incident. If the cloud finds a source of ignition it will cause a flash fire burst. This could track itself back to the source - ruptured tanker - and ignite the liquid pool on site. A direct terrorist attack could cause the LNG vapor to ignite immediately. In October 2002, an al-Qaeda attack on the tanker Limburg off the Yemeni coast amply demonstrated that it is not just their explosive qualities that make vessels shipping energy supplies appealing to extremist groups. The Limburg incident was a clear attempt to manipulate rising maritime insurance rates to adversely affect a country's economy. The sudden increase in insurance rates in the wake of that attack made shipping into Yemen too 'rich' for some firms. When this type of global manipulation takes place it is the end user who pays. Vessels are not the only target. The Royal Navy has frequently warned merchant ships in the Gulf to be on their guard after an al-Qaeda threat to target oil terminals in the area. Once again we have recently seen coalition naval forces in the area put on watch for possible terror threats to oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In Nigeria too there has been a growing spate of attacks and kidnappings of foreign oil workers, with one of the largest committed by The Movement for Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) resulting in the taking of 24 hostages. The group stated that if their demands were not met they would sink the cargo ship and then move to their next target area. The knock on effect of this episode
saw uproar in the hostages' home nation, and a call from the Filipino government for its nationals to keep away from Nigeria. With around 4,000 Filipinos in Nigeria, and most of them working in the oil industry, the wider impacts of attacks on energy targets are more obvious once again. According to the Nigerian government, the resulting instability in the region has cut Nigeria 's oil production and cost the country billions of dollars. Local communities and vessel owners aside, other sectors of the maritime community are worried by such threats to energy supply chain security. US Coast Guard security analysts have called for more additional measures to be employed to assist in risk management. In a report last year the USCG stated that some terminals might not be an attractive target for terrorists because of their remoteness, but it did recommend escort boats for LNG carriers to help prevent terrorist attacks. A security zone around facilities was also prescribed. On a wider scale, this issue leaves whole nations exposed. Japan is a particularly vulnerable example, illustrating perfectly the issues at play here. A major economic power yet a resourcepoor country, Japan imports all of its energy supplies - much of this coming from or via volatile areas such as the Persian Gulf. Most of its crude oil and natural gas supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz, described by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) as a key "chokepoint" in global energy shipping. Japan's concerns are reflected in reports recently commissioned and produced by their own Energy Security Group, which highlighted sea lanes in general, and the Strait of Malacca in particular as areas most vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Any sustained disruption of supplies, whether from terrorist attack, an increase in pirate activity, or from conventional warfare, could have catastrophic results for Japan. Of course it is not just Japan who would suffer from the after effects of an economic terrorist attack. A shutdown in
Gulf oil traffic would throw the world's energy markets into turmoil causing oil prices to rapidly increase. Further calls this year by a Saudi wing of al Qaeda for attacks on oil suppliers to the United States to be stepped up has done nothing to calm nerves. So are there solutions to the problem? Use less of the products themselves? The growth of LNG dependency doesn't look likely to slow in the immediate future, so solutions to these security risks are finally being placed higher on the international agenda. The events in Nigeria were a major talking point when NATO leaders met in Riga late last year. Security zones, additional vessels patrolling waterways leading into terminals were all discussed and would prove useful but they have to be maintained and that requires personnel and finance. What is not clear is who will pay for this. Another effective counter to this economic weak point may be to pursue international agreements to re-supply victims of an aggressive attack on energy sources. We agree wholeheartedly with The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) when it argues that the problem must be tackled vigorously by naval fleets, that there must be a greater willingness of local police to arrest the gangs known to be perpetrating these crimes, and more support from national government to help some of the poorer areas take the financial appeal away from piracy. Politically motivated groups are also often born out of economic desperation. There are smaller scale initiatives that can be employed - something which we at Securewest International always advocate. Carrying out regular reviews and risk analysis of routes commonly used to transport energy products will ensure any preventative action or rerouting can be taken ahead of time. Sharing any intelligence or small scale events with the maritime community or bodies like the IMB ensures that a bigger picture can be built and others notified of a shift in tactics or impending threat. What may seem trivial or almost inconsequential can very often provide another vital piece of intelligence.
Maritime Reporter & Engineering News